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MORE THAN SEGREGATION, RACIAL IDENTITY:
THE NEGLECTED QUESTION
IN PLESSY V. FERGUSON
Thomas J. Davis*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court's 1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson' has
long stood as an ignominious marker in U.S. law, symbolizing the nation's
highest legal sanction for the physical separation by race of persons in the
United States. In ruling against thirty-four-year-old New Orleans shoemaker
Homer Adolph Plessy's challenge to Louisiana's Separate Railway Act of
1890,2 the Court majority declared that
we think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the
internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or
immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property
without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of
the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
One commentator on the Court's treatment of African-American
civil rights cast the Plessy decision as "the climactic Supreme Court
pronouncement on segregated institutions."4 Historian C. Vann Woodward
dubbed the Court ruling "the national decision against equality." 5 Justice
John Marshall Harlan's vigorous and oft-quoted lone dissent in the case
prophesied that the majority decision handed down on Monday, 18 May
1896, would "in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by
this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case."'6 In the Court's 1857 decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,7 to which Justice Harlan referred, Chief Justice Roger B.
Professor of History and Visiting Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law.
A.B. cum laude, Fordham College, M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University, M.A. Ball State University, J.D.
cum laude, University at Buffalo Law School. My thanks to Mary Frances Berry, Brenda M. Brock,
Connie Strittmatter, Wilson J. Moses, Darryl C. Wilson, and to participants at various forums where I
offered portions and versions of the ideas I develop here.
I Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 1890 La. Acts 152.
3 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548.
4 CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1987)
(quoting Ralph T. Jans, Negro Civil Rights and the Supreme Court, 1865-1949 199 (1951) (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Chicago)). Lofgren's masterful study provides a comprehensive review of the
decision's contemporary and historical reception. See LOFGREN, supra, at 3-6.
s C. VANN WOODWARD, AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE
NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE 229 (1983).
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
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Taney infamously declared that African-Americans "had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect"8 and further asserted that African-
Americans had never been and could never be citizens of the United States.9
And indeed, the seven to one majority decision in Plessy, which
Massachusetts-born Justice Henry Billings Brown I° authored, was lambasted
in time as "a compound of bad logic, bad history, bad sociology, and bad
constitutional law.""II
In an inspired illustration of the power of legal history, historian
Charles F. Lofgren has shown that "simply condemning the decision
promotes an understanding neither of it nor of America in the late nineteenth
century.' 2 Focusing on aspects of what he described as "the constitutional-
legal context of southern race relations and American racism from the end of
the Civil War to the turn of the century,"'13 Lofgren further explained that
"[t]he Plessy case has not been well understood."'14 He clarified much about
the case in its origins and development and particularly its fit with the
dominant, orthodox, popular, and (pseudo)scientific thinking of its day.' 5
Lofgren's corrective focus on the law and practice of transportation
segregation and on the emerging legal issues in the case, like other foci
however, left in the shadows a central element of the Plessy case that has
proven as persistent in its being ignored and in its being important.
Segregation has towered as the center of Plessy, yet it was more the
tip than the substance of the challenge. The issue of individual identity in the
social construction of race formed the core of Plessy's case. The source of
personal identity was the crucial issue at which Plessy's original and ultimate
challenge aimed. He and his supporters worked at raising questions in the
nation's highest court about the relation of law and racial identity. They
hoped to press an answer to a fundamentally important question: Who has
authority to decide a person's racial identity, the person or government?
Justice Henry Billings Brown's majority opinion dismissively noted
the identity issue, at least tangentially. "The power to assign [a passenger] to
a particular coach obviously implies the power to determine to which race
the passenger belongs,"'16 Justice Brown conceded. Also implicated was "the
8 Id. at 406.
9 Id. at 411, 426.
10 See Robert J. Glennon Jr., Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values in Tension, 44 U. COLO. L.
REv. 553,566-601 (1973).
I ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 101 (1960).
12 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 4.
13 Id. at 5.
14 Id.
15 David W. Southern, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation. By Charles A.
Lofgren, 74 J. AM. HIST. 1364, 1364-65 (1988) (book review).
16 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549 (1896).
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power to determine who, under the laws of the particular state, is to be
deemed a white, and who a colored, person,"' 7 he noted. But Justice Brown
skirted the issue by declaring that "[t]his question, though indicated in the
brief of the plaintiff in error, does not properly arise upon the record in this
case."'
18
This article aims to parse the strategy, shape, and substance of the
question "indicated in the brief of the plaintiff in error"' 9 and its origins and
careful development by Plessy, his supporters, and his attorneys in the record
of the case. It probes obscured arguments about the law of racial identity
with which Plessy and his collaborators hoped to prevail, not only against the
thickening divide of segregation but against government-imposed racial
identity. Their reasoning pushed varied points but rested on the underlying
principle that race was indeterminate. Missing that point has left the efforts
in Plessy misunderstood and misused.
Pursuing the racial identity issue was the road not taken in Plessy.
As with several crucial components of a soundly reasoned analysis of the
issues raised in the case, Justice Brown's majority opinion (and Justice
Harlan's famous dissent) gave short shrift to the law's determining the racial
cast of personal identity. The decision left the American nation to sickening
segregation and subsequent rejection of possible paths to explore something
more than insubstantial notions of a "color-blind" constitution. 0
Part II reaches back to Civil War and Reconstruction race relations
and rights issues to outline political and social developments that gave rise to
what became Plessy v. Ferguson and the Louisiana statute that it challenged,
the Separate Car Act of 1890. Tracing the roots of opposition to racial
segregation in public accommodations to the federal Civil Rights Act of
1866 and forward to Louisiana's constitution of 1869, the article attends to
the role of the New Orleans Creole community whose members reveled in
distinguishing themselves as "persons of color." It evidences a coalition of
interests within the African-American community on issues of civil rights
and highlights not merely distinguishable groups but groups recognizing, and
at times touting, their differences within the social and legal construction of
what often has appeared in simple form of race as a monolith of persons of
African descent. In illustrating the prominence of "free men of color ' 2'




20 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
21 David C. Rankin, The Origins of Black Leadership in New Orleans During Reconstruction, 40
J. S. HIST. 417, 427 (1974) ("Over three-fourths of the privileged free colored class from which so many
of these leaders sprang were mulatto in 1860.").
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particularly on Louisiana's one-time acting Governor Pinckney Benton
Stewart Pinchback22 and on Louis A. Martinet and Rodolphe L. Desdunes,
two leaders in the New Orleans Creole community. These men showed the
legacy of mixed heritage in Louisiana and the recognition in state law of
racial identity as a matter of reputation and property. Personal valuation and
individual integrity appeared attached to the reputation of a person's racial
identity.
Part III unfolds the behind-the-scenes efforts of the Citizens'
Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law.23
Commonly called the Comiti des Citoyens because of its Creole connections,
this was the group that choreographed and orchestrated what became the
Plessy case.24 It retained as lead counsel25 nationally-known Albion Winegar
Tourgre26 to craft the case along with James C. Walker, an unheralded
attorney in New Orleans.
Part IV treats the work the Comiti, mostly through Martinet, did
with Tourgre and Walker to lay out a test case using Rodolphe L.
Desdunes's twenty-one-year-old son, Daniel F. Desdunes.27 A challenge to
the Separate Car Ace8 that a group of blacks unrelated to the Comiti brought
in Abbott v. Hicks29-- which the Louisiana Supreme Court decided in May
1892-short-circuited State v. Desdunes" and sent the Comitj in search of a
new plaintiff, who turned out to be Homer A. Plessy.
Part V relates the process of getting Plessy to and through the
Louisiana courts and on to the U.S. Supreme Court, which from the
beginning was the Comiti's desired forum for its arguments on race and
color identity as bases for legal discrimination.31 Part VI treats the
22 JAMES HASKINS, PINCKNEY BENTON STEWART PINCHBACK (1973).
23 1890 La. Acts 152; LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 29-30.
24 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 29-43. CrrIZENs' COMMITrEE TO TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE SEPARATE CAR LAW, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS FOR THE ANNULMENT OF ACT Il1 OF 1890 (1897)
(available at the Amistad Research Center in New Orleans).
25 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 30. See the succession of letters from Martinet to Tourgde: five in
October 1891, dated 5, 11, 25 and 28, and one dated 7 December 1891. DEAN H. KELLER, AN INDEX TO
THE ALBION W. TOURGItE PAPERS IN THE CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY (1964); Albion
W. Tourgde, Albion W. Tourgde Papers (unpublished papers, on microfilm at Chautauqua County
Historical Society, Westfield, New York) [hereinafter Tourgde Papers].
26 THEODORE L. GROSS, ALBION W. TOURGtE (1963); OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S
CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR ToURGtE (1965); Sidney Kaplan, Albion W. Tourgde:
Attorney for the Segregated, 49 J. NEGRO HIST. 128, 128-33 (1964).
27 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 33.
2S 1890 La. Acts 152.
29 Abbott v. Hicks, 11 So. 74 (La. 1892).
30 State v. Desdunes, No. 18,685 (Section A, Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans 1892)
(photocopy available in case file at Archives and Manuscripts Department, Earl K. Long Library,
University of New Orleans along with information files against Desdunes filed on 14 March 1892 and his
plea dated 19 March 1892 and marked "filed" on 21 March 1892) [hereinafter Desdunes Case File].
31 Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948,948-49 (La. 1892); LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 43.
[Vol. 10: 1
2004] The Neglected Question in Plessy v. Ferguson 5
preparation for Plessy's hearing in the U.S. Supreme Court, analyzing the
brief Walker and Tourg~e presented to unpack their argument about race and
color identify within the historical development of miscegenation that
produced what they called "a mixed community. 3 2  Part VII concludes
discussion of the legal disposition of the questions of the state's role in racial
identity as the Plessy Court saw it.
H. REACHING BACK TO CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION RACE
RELATIONS AND RIGHTS ISSUES
The development of what became Plessy v. Ferguson began most
immediately at the start of the Louisiana legislature's 1890 session in May
33
with opposition to a bill to require that
all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this
state, shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the
white, and colored races, by providing two or more passenger
coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger
coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations.34
Members of the American Citizens' Equal Rights Association (ACERA)35
that former Louisiana Governor Pinckney Benton Stewart Pinchback
36
helped organize37 in Louisiana and Tennessee denounced the proposed law."
32 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 35 (PHILLIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER eds., 1975) [hereinafter,
LANDMARK BRIEFS].
33 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28. For many details of events and for direction to sources of
information, the discussion presented here is heavily indebted to Lofgren's masterful study and to the rich
collection of materials in OTTO H. OLSEN, THE THIN DISGUISE: TURNING POINT IN NEGRO HISTORY;
PLEsSY V. FERGUSON, A DOCUMENTARY PRESENTATION, 1864-1896 (1967).
34 1890 La. Acts 152.
35 Id. The American Citizens' Equal Rights Association appeared in various states in the
aftermath of the Civil War. Among the earliest appearances was that of the American Citizens' Equal
Rights Association for the State of California evidenced in its official organ, a newspaper titled The
Elevator. Published in San Francisco with an inaugural issue dated 7 April 1865, The Elevator published
at least through 12 March 1869. Microfilm of that issue appears in the two-reel "Negro Newspaper"
collection done by the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service for the Committee on Negro Studies
of the American Council of Learned Societies, 1947. See also the story of the Georgia Equal Rights
Association (GERA) that began in the fall of 1865 with its primary goal "to aid in securing for all, without
regard to race or color, equal political rights." RUTH CURRIE-MCDANIEL, CARPETBAGGER OF
CONSCIENCE: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN EMORY BRYANT 59 (1987); Lee W. Formwalt, The Origins of
African-American Politics in Southwest Georgia: A Case Study of Black Political Organization During
Presidential Reconstruction 1865-1867, 77 J. NEGRO HIST. 211, 211-22 (1992).
36 HASKINS, supra note 22.
37 Roland C. McConnell, Review of Pinckney Benton Stewart Pinchback. by James Haskins, 59 J.
NEGRO HIST. 396, 397-98 (1974) (book review).
38 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28.
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"Citizenship is national and has no color,"39 insisted ACERA's memorial to
the Louisiana legislature filed on 24 May 1890.40
Pinchback's association with ACERA and the identity of leading
signers of the May 24 memorial related opposition to the Separate Car Bill
back to contentious issues from the years immediately after the Civil War.
Pinchback's presence at the start and the persistence of Louis A. Martinet
and Rodolphe L. Desdunes, two leaders in the New Orleans Creole
community that reveled in distinguishing themselves as "persons of color,"
evidenced something of a coalition of interests within the African-American
community on issues of civil rights. Making race a basis of discrimination
rankled those who shared descent from Africa because the practice collapsed
all persons together in the same position. But not all those who shared
descent from Africa shared the same rationales in opposing race-based
segregation: that was a lesson to become clear in the developments that
produced the Plessy case.
The identity and attached ideologies of Pinchback, Martinet, and
Desdunes also illustrated the tripartite distinction of "race, color, and
previous condition of servitude." 4' The concept appeared in different form in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 the first federal statute enforcing what a
majority of Congress then perceived as personal rights stemming from the
outlawing of slavery in the Thirteenth Amendment.43 The Act spoke of "race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery., 44  The
altered form became constitutional parlance in the Fifteenth Amendment. 45
And it would be repeated in subsequent civil rights statutes46 although the
39 OLSEN, supra note 33, at 47.
40 Id. at 47-50; LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28.
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XV. See also WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965) (discussing the crafting of the language of the
Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Note, Title VII-Discrimination on Basis of "Race" or
"Color"-- Federal Court Recognizes Cause of Action for Intraracial Bias-Walker v. IRS, 713 F. Supp.
403 (N.D. Ga. 1989), 103 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1990) (noting that specific references to both "race" and
"color" in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicated congressional intent to establish the two
terms as distinct elements in a Title VII claim).
42 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
43 See also Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1976)
(describing the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as enacted, to implement the Thirteenth Amendment's
"affirmative declaration that all vestiges of slavery would be illegal").
44 Civil Rights Act of 1866, §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
45 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
46 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17). See also Note, supra note 41 (discussing the court's
acceptance of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a basis for recognizing a discrimination claim
by a light-skinned African-American employee against his or her dark-skinned African-American
supervisor).
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Civil Rights Act of 1875 was closer to repeating the 1866 phrasing of "race
and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude. 47
None of the three grounds completely covered the others. They were
distinct. Not everyone designated to be of the same race was of the same
color. Nor did all of the same race or even of the same color share the same
"previous condition of servitude." Not all designated "black" had, for
example, been slaves. Some distinguished by color as other than black-as
"mulatto," for example-had been slaves and others not.
In short, within the social and legal construction of what often
appeared in simple form as the monolith of race were clustered and scattered
blocks and pieces forming not merely distinguishable groups but groups
recognizing, and at times touting, their differences. To identify Pinchback,
Martinet, and Desdunes as "blacks" or as "Negro," for example, marked them
only in a dichotomous set of categories to separate them from "white." Such
marking showed no differences among the men or between them and others
in the category black or Negro. The thrust of such marking pushed against
recognizing individuality or personality. Rather, it perpetuated as primary a
perception of identity in community and experience that was external, not
necessarily internal. It imposed an arbitrary and common identity that men
such as Pinchback, Martinet, and Desdunes refused to accept.
Not black in color or even dark, Pinchback, Martinet, and Desdunes
were of "mixed blood," as one phrase of their time put it. None were ever
enslaved. Considerable privilege in fact advantaged each. They were not
from the fields, which in Louisiana and elsewhere was where the "blacks"
were. All three recognized their African descent, and all three demonstrated
unyielding commitment to securing those of African descent equality under
law. Indeed, equality under law was the theme of Crusader, Martinet's New
Orleans-based weekly newspaper that he opened in 1889. The theme
resounded in the columns Desdunes contributed to Crusader. And it marked
Pinchback's remarkable public career beginning with his being an equal
rights crusader from the Civil War era.
The son of a white Mississippi slave-holding plantation owner and a
slave woman manumitted before she bore her child in Macon, Georgia, in
May 1837, the free-born Pinchback came of age in Ohio.48 He returned
South during the Civil War and served with the celebrated Corps d'Afrique
into which the First Regiment of the Louisiana Native Guard were
organized.49 The unit was later designated the Seventy-third Regiment U.S.
Colored Troops.5°
47 Civil Rights Act of 1875, § I, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
48 HASKINS, supra note 22.
49 See generally, ROLAND C. MCCONNELL, NEGRO TROOPS OF ANTEBELLUM LOUISIANA: A
HISTORY OF THE BATTALION OF FREE MEN OF COLOR (1968) (discussing the pre-Civil War role of Blacks
2004]
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After the war, Pinchback helped to organize the Republican Fourth
Ward club in New Orleans,"1 which was the South's largest city (with a
population of 170,000 in 1860)52 and leading port. It was also the first major
Confederate city the Union captured in April 1862. 5" He became a growing
political force14 in a city whose black population more than doubled from
24,000 in 1860'5 to at least 50,000 in 1870.56 As a delegate to the state
convention of 1867-1868, he helped write Louisiana's constitution of
1868, 57 which among other things outlawed racial discrimination in public
accommodations. It declared,
All persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any
conveyance of a public character; and all places of business or
public resort, or for which a license is required by either State,
parish or municipal authority, shall be deemed of a public
character, and shall be open to the accommodation and patronage
of all persons without distinction or discrimination on account of
race or color.
58
The new framework was "a constitution that guarantees to you, to me, and to
all men equal privileges and rights, civil and political," black advocates
declared.59
Pinchback was elected to the state senate in 1868, became the
chamber's president pro tempore, and succeeded to being lieutenant
governor in 1871 when the black incumbent, Oscar J. Dunn,6° died under
in the South); Mary F. Berry, Negro Troops in Blue and Gray: The Louisiana Native Guards, 1861-1863,
8 LA. HIST. 165, 165-190 (1967); Alice Dunbar-Nelson, People of Color in Louisiana: Part II, 2 J.
NEGRO HIST. 51, 69 (1917) (discussing the First Regiment of the Louisiana Native Guard).
so Dunbar-Nelson, supra note 49, at 69. See also Alice Dunbar-Nelson, People of Color in
Louisiana: Part!, I J. NEGRO HIST. 361,361-376 (1916).
51 Agnes S. Grosz, The Political Career of Pinckney Benton Stewart Pinchback, 27 LA. HIST. Q.
527,532 (1944).
52 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN 1860, at 195 (1864).
53 GERALD M. CAPERS, OCCUPIED CITY: NEW ORLEANS UNDER THE FEDERALS, 1862-1865, at
25(1965).
54 Grosz, supra note 51, at 531-32.
55 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 52, at 195.
56 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE NINTH CENSUS 53 (1872).
57 See. e.g., JOURNAL OF THE LOUISIANA STATE CONVENTION, 1867-1868, at 129-130 (noting
Pinchback's presence and activity at the Convention).
59 LA. CONST. art. XIII (1868).
59 A.E. Perkins, Oscar James Dunn, 4 PHYLON 102, 109-10 (1943) (quoting REPUBLICAN, Jan.
16,1868, at 1).
60 d. Born a slave in Louisiana probably in 1820 or 1821 rather than 1825 as often reported,
Dunn apprenticed as a plasterer and became a fugitive slave. Id. at 105 (citing 7 APPLETON'S
CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 255 (1889)). In June 1868, Dunn became the first African-
American to hold public executive office in the United States by becoming lieutenant governor-a
position for which Pinchback nominated him. Id. at 109 (quoting REPUBLICAN, Jan. 15, 1868). But cf.
Rankin, supra note 21, at 437 (disputing that Dunn was a slave).
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mysterious circumstances that left more than a few suggesting murder by
poisoning. 61 Dunn was something of a rising star in the national Republican
ranks as his name appeared as a possible vice presidential running mate for
President Ulysses S. Grant's re-election bid in 1872.62 The possible political
shenanigans that may have cost Dunn his life may also have snuffed
Pinchback's political career, for although elected to both the U.S. House of
Representatives and to the U.S. Senate in 1872 and 1873, Pinchback never
officially sat in either chamber. Charges of election fraud and irregularities
returned him to Louisiana where, as lieutenant governor, he became the first
African-American to serve as governor of a state when impeachment
proceedings against sitting Governor Henry Clay Warmoth made Pinchback
Louisiana's chief executive from 9 December 1872 to 13 January 1873. His
weekly newspaper, the New Orleans Louisianian, persistently promoted civil
equality.63
Pinchback necessarily engaged in common cause with Dunn, whom
the fair-skinned mulatto described "as black as the ace of spades."64 They
were in the same party. They stood on the same base of support-
Louisiana's population of black voters. They pursued much the same
political agenda although they reportedly differed markedly in habits,
temperament and character. 65  They worked with an African-American
political leadership that for the most part contrasted markedly in complexion
and social community with the African-American political base.66
Overwhelmingly, postbellum Louisiana's African-American political
leaders, at least those in New Orleans, then the state capital, were "free men
61 See generally, Marcus B. Christian, The Theory of the Poisoning of Oscar J. Dunn, 6 PHYLON
254 (1945). The chief attending physician listed the official cause of Dunn's death as "congestion of the
brain." Perkins, supra note 59, at 117. Long after the fact and clearly hearsay, an assistant keeper of Vital
Records for the City of New Orleans said, "Oscar J. Dunn was poisoned, you know. Of course, it was
difficult to fix the guilt." Id. at 116-17.
62 Perkins, supra note 59, at 118 (quoting COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 23, 1871). In noting the
death, the Louisville Courier-Journal wrote that
at the time of his death, Dunn was the acknowledged leader of the Grant wing of
the Louisiana Republicans, and was engaged in a movement which, there are many
reasons to believe, had for its object the elevation of his name to the place of Vice-
President upon the Republican ticket next year, or in 1876 at the farthest.
Id.
63 Thomas J. Davis, Louisiana, in THE BLACK PRESS IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1979 151,160 (1983).
" WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR: THE BLACK ELITE, 1880-1920 171
(1990).
65 Perkins, supra note 59, at 115.
6 See generally Rankin, supra note 21.
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of color, 6 7 not men who were ever slaves. That condition, as well as their
characteristically fair complexions as what were called "light-colored
mulattoes, ''68 distinguished them from dark-skinned ex-slaves. 69  Louisiana
differed significantly in that regard from other slave states where ex-slaves in
fact dominated postbellum African-American political leadership.7 ° One
historian noted that "free Negroes had enjoyed certain advantages in
antebellum New Orleans which eased their path to political predominance
during Reconstruction.'
' 1
Indeed, Louisiana's Supreme Court broadly distinguished those
noted in city directories and other publications with what the New Orleans
Picayune newspaper in 1860 described as "the mystic letters-f.m.c. '' 72 In
the 1856 case of State v. Harrison,73 the court held that Louisiana's one-
hundred-section "Act relative to slaves and free colored persons" 74 treated
"two distinct objects"7 5 and thus was void for violating Article 115 of the
state constitution,76 which read, "Every law enacted by the Legislature, shall
embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title."
77
The Harrison court declared further that "the slave, and the free
colored person-[were] two classes which it is impossible to confound in
legal parlance. 7  The court explained that
in the eye of the Louisiana law, there is (with the exception of
political rights, of certain social privileges, and of the obligations
67 Id. at 420-27 (noting that "over three quarters of the privileged free colored class from which
so many of these leaders sprang were mulatto in 1860"). See also Bardolph, supra note 21 (giving a
broader view of Negro politicians).
68 Rankin, supra note 2 1, at 426.
69 Id. at 420-22, 425-27.
70 Id. at 420. See also id. n.10 (identifying studies arguing for dominance of ex-slave leadership
in the postbellum period called Reconstruction). See, e.g., AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, FROM
PLANTATION TO GHETTO: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN NEGROES 152-53 (1966)
(discussing the political role of ex-slaves in the post-Reconstruction South); ALRUTHEUs AMBUSH
TAYLOR, THE NEGRO IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF VIRGINIA 5-7 (1926) (emphasizing the close
connection and interaction between free blacks and whites in Virginia); VERNON L. WHARTON, THE
NEGRO IN MISsISSIPPI, 1865-1890, at 164 (1965).
71 Rankin, supra note 21, at 420.
72 Id. at 42 1.
73 State v. Harrison, I 1 La. Ann. 722 (1856).
74 Id. at 722.
75 Id. at 723.
76 Id. at 722-23.
77 Id. (quoting LA. CONST. art. 115 (1853)). The article replicated Article 118 in the constitution
Louisiana crafted in convention in 1844 and 1845 and adopted by election to be effective on January 25,
1846. 4A SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 5 (William F. Swindler ed.,
1975). See Harrison, 11 La. Ann. at 722-23 (discussing the reasons for Article 115 and quoting an
explication provided in Walker v. Caldwell, 4 La. Ann. 297, 298 (1849), by then-Chief Justice Eustis, a
prominent member of the Louisiana's 1845 constitutional convention).
78 Harrison, I I La. Ann. at 724.
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of jury and militia service) all the difference between a free man of
color and a slave, that there is between a white man and a slave.
7 9
For emphasis, the court elaborated differences in capacity to contract, inherit,
and testify at trial.80 "The free man of color is capable of contracting. He
can acquire by inheritance and transmit property by will. He is a competent
witness in all civil suits, '81 Justice Alexander McKenzie Buchanan wrote for
the court. He explained,
The slave, on the contrary, is the object of contracts, not a legal
party to contracts. He may be sold or mortgaged, but he cannot
sell or mortgage. He can neither inherit, nor make a will, because
he can possess nothing as owner. He is inadmissible as a witness
in any civil suit whatever. If accused of crime, he is tried by a
special tribunal, to which the safeguards of the common law are
unknown. 2
The court's view sectioned the Pelican State's people into something akin to
three castes-whites, free people of color, and slaves.8 3
The distinctions the court noted in 1855 hardly ceased with the
emancipation decreed in the Thirteenth Amendment in 18654 Nor did the
distinctions exist only in the court's eyes or only in whites' eyes,85 for that
matter. African-Americans recognized differences among themselves, and
the differences included those of condition and color as well as character.86
"Race" and "color" were not the same, even to persons of African descent





83 See Laura Foner, The Free People of Color in Louisiana and St. Domingue: A Comparative
Portrait of Two Three-Caste Societies, 3 J. SOC. HIST. 417 (1970) (contrasting Louisiana's three-caste
system to that of the rest of the South).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XlII.
85 IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 198
(1975); Robert Brent Toplin, Between Black and White: Attitudes Toward Southern Mulattoes, 1830-
1861, 45 J. S. HIST. 185, 194 (1979). Whites, particularly southern whites, perceived differences among
African-Americans on the basis of color. Berlin and Toplin note a preference among southern whites for
lighter-skinned African-Americans. Toplin wrote that southern whites tended to consider dark-skinned
African-Americans "idle, lazy, [and] insolent," but tended to consider light-skinned African-Americans,
especially the mixed offspring called "mulattoes," to be "industrious, hard-working," and "worthy of
trust." Toplin, supra, at 194.
86 See E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 274 (MacMillan Co. 1957)
(1949) (discussing persistent color prejudice among African-Americans).
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Americans expected not to be treated the same as all other African-
Americans.87 They rejected lumping.
Indeed, at least a few of Louisiana's free people of color were
antebellum slaveholders.88 Most distanced themselves, however, from
slavery and from slaves, particularly in their lineage. They tended
characteristically to boast, as one-time internal revenue assessor and New
Orleans police commissioner 89 Blanc F. Joubert did, of "never" being a slave
and that "none of my family were."90  If they acknowledged some slave
lineage, they tended to put the kinship generations removed, as the New
Orleans leader Joseph A. Raynal illustrated in declaring, "I am descended
from five or six generations of freemen."9' And more than a few, while
acknowledging their African ancestry, declined to identify themselves as
African-American. Joubert, for example, by one report "claims to be a
frenchman [sic] and not an African. 92 In another report Joubert accepted
being of "both races, 93 noting with at least a hint of displeasure that "they
call me in Louisiana a colored man."94 Yet he simultaneously discounted his
African ancestry by declaring, "I cannot tell you whether I am a white man
or a colored man."95 And, indeed, one observer described Joubert as "a fine
looking man and instead of being black he is whiter than the majority of men
down here. 
9 6
Their mixed heritage loomed as a large legacy for many. For some,
ancestry induced at least ambivalence, if not anxiety. The New Orleans
cigarmaker Octave Belot, who according to contemporaries could "very
easily pass for a white man, 9 7 declared that "I cannot trace my origin to any
colored family."98 In reply to a question as to what his racial identity was,
one of Belot's New Orleans confreres, J. B. Esnard, said, "I cannot answer
that; I do not know exactly."99 Some rested on official records to indicate
87 Toplin, supra note 85, at 193 (stating that the tendency among light-skinned blacks,
particularly mulattoes, was to "consider themselves superior to the other slaves").
88 Rankin, supra note 21, at 421,436 (listing names of twenty-three of New Orleans's postbellum
African-American political leaders who held slaves in antebellum Louisiana). See also BERLIN, supra
note 85 (giving a broader perspective on antebellum Afican-American slaveholders); LARRY KOGER,
BLACK SLAVEOWNERS: FREE BLACK SLAVE MASTERS N SOUTH CAROLINA, 1790-1860 (1985).
"9 ERIC FONER, FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING
RECONSTRUCTION 124 (1993).
90 Rankin, supra note 21, at 422,
91 Id.
92 FONER, supra note 89.
93 Rankin, supra note 21, at 428 (quoting REPUBLICAN, May, 13 1871).
94 Id.
95 Id. (quoting NEW ORLEANS TIMES, Oct. I1, 1874).
96 FONER, supra note 89, at 124.
97 Rankin, supra note 2 1, at 427.
98 Id.
99 d. at 428.
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identity.1°° More than a few rejected the judgment of others and sued to have
official records of birth and race identify them or their relatives according to
their own view-usually not as black or colored but as white. Joubert's
family, in fact, sued the New Orleans Board of Health'0 ' to have him
categorized as white in line with his French father'0 2 with whom he may have
lived in Paris from 1859 to 1864.'03 Such suits over racial identity were not
uncommon, 0 4 not only in Louisiana but throughout the United States.'0 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court became more than familiar with issues
of racial identity. Indeed, the author of the court's opinion, when it handled
the Plessy case in 1893,106 authored the court's leading decision treating
racial identity,' °7  or more precisely racial mis-identity, as actionable
slander.'0° In the 1888 case of Spotorno v. Fourichon'09 from the Civil
District Court for Orleans Parish'1 0 where New Orleans sat,' the court held
that "[u]nder the social habits, customs, and prejudices prevailing in
Louisiana, it cannot be disputed that charging a white man with being a
negro is calculated to inflict injury and damage."'"1 2  The court further
explained that it was passing no judgment on what it identified as the
dominant thinking but was "concerned with these social conditions simply as
' Id. (quoting Mrs. Josephine Davis's comments on her husband Cooper Edgard Charles Davis's
heritage: "On the question of his race, I am unable to testify positively. I will have to abide by
whatever the records show concerning him").
101 Id.
102 FONER, supra note 89. at 124.
103 Id.
'04 Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth
Century South, 108 Yale L.J. 109 (1998). See also Ariela J. Gross, "Like Master, Like Man":
Constructing Whiteness in the Commercial Law of Slavery, 1800-1861, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 263 (1996).
105 See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1991). University of
Southern California law professor and historian Ariela J. Gross has illumined the question of race in court
in her essay, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South. See
Gross, supra note 104. My thanks to Professor Gross for sharing here work with me.
106 Exparte Plessy, II So. 948 (La. 1892).
107 Louisiana Justice Charles E. Fenner authored the decisions. Perhaps worth noting here is
Justice Fenner's championing of democratic elements of Louisiana's heritage and, particularly its civil
code-in contrast to the common law. See Charles Erasmus Fenner, The Civil Code of Louisiana as a
Democratic Institution (unpublished manuscript, on microfilm at the Law Collection, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C.). See also Charles E. Fenner, Charles E. Fenner Papers (unpublished papers, on file
with Southern Historical Collection, Manuscripts Department, Library of the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill). Justice Fenner served as officer in the Confederate Trans-Mississippi Department and as
a Reconstruction-era politician before being elevated to the Louisiana Supreme Court. LOFGREN, supra
note 4, at 43, 46-59; Eric J. Sundquist, Mark Twain and Homer Plessy, 24 REPRESENTATIONS 102, 107
(1988).




"12 Id. (noting that charging a white man with being a Negro is actionable slander).
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facts. They exist," the court noted, "and for that reason we deal with
them."' 13
The opinion in Spotorno v. Fourichon"4 reached back to the 1869
case of Toye v. McMahon"5 for authority on whether such slander was
actionable under Louisiana's 1868 constitution. 16  In the case from the
Fourth District Court of New Orleans," 7 Louis Toye sued Thomas
McMahon for slander for allegedly "stating publicly at a meeting of the
Hackmen's Benevolent Association that he, plaintiff, 'was a colored man,'
meaning thereby a person of African origin."' 18 Evidencing the dichotomous
racial segregation of the day, Toye alleged further that McMahon's statement
"caus[ed] him to be 'disgracefully expelled from the association""' 19 by his
fellow white drivers of horses and of the two- or four-wheeled public
carriages or cabriolets most frequently called, in shortened form, "cabs."'20
Toye swore that he had no African ancestry. He averred that he was a
"British subject of pure white, or Caucassian blood.'
22
Toye v. McMahon 23 and Spotorno v. Fourichon21 illustrated that
Louisiana law recognized racial identity as a matter of reputation and also as
a matter of property. Personal valuation and individual integrity appeared
attached to the reputation of a person's racial identity. The valuation varied,
and character and class mattered in that variation in the eyes of the juries in
Toye v. McMahon 25 and Spotorno v. Fourichon.126 Character and class also
mattered greatly to men such as Pinchback, Louis A. Martinet, Rodolphe L.
Desdunes, and their confreres in the New Orleans Creole community whose
persistent and significant self-reporting highlighted the ambivalence of their
ancestry.
As the postbellum Creole leader Blanc F. Joubert illustrated in
asserting that he was of "both races"'' 27 while also declaring, "I cannot tell
you whether I am a white man or a colored man,"'' 21 the basic classification
113 Id.
114 Id.
Is Toye v. McMahon, 21 La. Ann. 308 (1869).
116 Spotornov. Fourichon, 4 So. 71,71 (La. 1888) (citing Toye, 21 La. Ann. at 308).
17 Toye, 21 La. Ann. at 308.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 OXFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
121 Toye v. McMahon, 21 La. Ann. 308, 308 (1869) (quoting Toye's statement "that he is a British
subject of pure white, or Caucasian blood").
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Spotorno v. Fourichon, 4 So. 71 (La. 1888).
125 Toye, 21 La. Ann. at 308.
126 Spotorno, 4 So. at 71.
127 Rankin, supra note 21, at 428.
128 Id.
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of Creole of color overlapped the dichotomous designations of black and
white. In regard to reputation derived from racial identity, the self-concept
of men such as Joubert exceeded the conventional pairing opposing black
and white. They aspired to the distinction of their mixed heritage. They
reveled in their self-concept and the society associated with it as well as in a
sense of distinct culture.129 Creoles saw themselves as of a particular class
higher than the low status ascribed to the blacks of the fields who formed the
mass of ex-slaves.
30
Attorneys such as Pinchback and Martinet, who was also a
physician,' other professionals, and craftsmen such as shoemaker Homer
Plessy resembled common blacks neither in color nor in socio-economic
class. As the constructed scale of segregation increasingly collapsed
distinctions of social style and personal substance into a unitary category
called "blacks" or "colored," such Creoles of color vigorously resisted. In
concert with others denied civil rights because of race, they protested on
principle that in the United States "citizenship is national and has no
color."'132 They protested on practical grounds too. Like anyone else, they
wanted what they paid for; if they purchased first class accommodations,
then they wanted to be provided with first class accommodations and not to
be relegated to another class because of race. 133  They protested more
personally also to be recognized for who they were, for their reputation, their
self-concept, and their personal identity. They fought against having their
individuality or their collective character made a creature of the collectivized
state-control of segregation. Thus did Martinet, Desdunes, and other Creoles
of color join the American Citizens' Equal Rights Association in denouncing
129 See generally, RODOLPHE LUCIEN DESDUNES, NOS HOMMES ET NOTRE HISTOIRE: NOTICES
BIOGRAPHIQUES ACCOMPAGNtES DE REFLEXIONS ET DE SOUVENIRS PERSONNELS, HOMMAGE A LA
POPULATION CRIOLE, EN SOUVENIR DES GRANDS HOMMES QU'ELLE A PRODUITS ET DES BONNES
CHOSES QU'ELLE A ACCOMPLIES [OUR PEOPLE AND OUR HISTORY: A TRIBUTE TO THE CREOLE PEOPLE
OF COLOR IN MEMORY OF THE GREAT MEN THEY 1HAVE GIVEN US AND OF THE GOOD WORKS THEY
HAVE ACCOMPLISHED] (Sister Dorothea Olga McCants trans., Louisiana State University Press 1973)
(1911).
130 WILLARD B. GATEWOOD, ARISTOCRATS OF COLOR: THE BLACK ELITE, 1880-1920, at 149-81
(1990) (treating "the role of the color scale as a stratifier in the black community").
131 FONER, supra note 89, at 142; Nils R. Douglas, Who Was Louis A. Martinet? (1966)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Amistad Research Center).
132 OLSEN, supra note 33.
1 See, e.g., DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1, 2 (1875). In DeCuir, Josephine DeCuir of Pointe
Coupe Parish, Louisiana, sued Captain John C. Benson of the Mississippi River steamboat Governor
Allen for denying her a berth in the ladies' cabin for a trip upriver from New Orleans in July 1872. Id.
DeCuir sued on the basis of the equal accommodation provision in the Louisiana Constitution, LA.
CONST. art. XIII (1869), as enforced by An Act to Enforce the Thirteenth Article of the Constitution of
this State, and to Regulate the Licenses Mentioned in Said Thirteenth Article, 1869 La. Acts 37. Decuir,
27 La. Ann. at 2. She won at trial and the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld her award of $1000 in
damages and the State's power to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodation. Id. at 6.
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Louisiana's Separate Car Act'34 in 1890 and in organizing the Citizens'
Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law 3' in
September 1891.136
III. CREATING A COLORLESS RECORD FOR A TEST CASE
Martinet acted as the engine of the Citizens' Committee to Test the
Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law.137 "I have nearly all the work [of]
our Committee to do & it keeps me busy,"'3' he noted in October 1891.
"Matters would progress more rapidly if other members of our Committee
would take some of this work on them,"'' 3 9 he chafed. With Desdunes and
other Creoles of color apparently aggravated with the American Citizens'
Equal Rights Association's lack of more forceful action in opposing
Louisiana's Separate Car Act140 in the more than fourteen months after its
passage, Martinet had pushed to organize the separate committee.' 4' As the
group they called the Comiti des Citoyens proceeded to choreograph and
orchestrate what became the Plessy case, Creole members began to dominate
the committee.
42
To craft the case, Martinet secured nationally-known Albion
Winegar Tourg6e 143 as lead counsel for the committee.'" Converted to the
antislavery cause during his twice-wounded service as a U.S. Army
lieutenant in the Civil War,"15 Tourg6e became an equal rights crusader after
the War.' 46 Moving from his roots in Ohio's Western Reserve in 1865, he
relocated to Greensboro, North Carolina. He practiced law and tried his
hand at politics, becoming a delegate to North Carolina's 1868 constitutional
convention. He then became a state superior court judge and so leading a
Republican advocate against class and race oppression that the Ku Klux Klan
134 1890 La. Acts 152; LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28-29.
135 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28-29.
136 Id. at 29-30.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 30.
140 1890 La. Acts 152.
141 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 29-30.
142 Id. at 29-43; Report of the Proceedings for the Annulment of Act No. I I I Commonly Known
as the Separate Car Law (Sept. 5, 1891) (unpublished report, on file with Amistad Research Center).
143 OLSEN, supra note 26; GROSS, supra note 26.
I" LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 30. See the succession of letters from Martinet to Tourgde: five in
October 1891, dated 5, 11,25 and 28, and one dated 7 December 1891. KELLER, supra note 25; Tourgde
Papers, supra note 25.
145 James M. McPherson, Book Review, 71 AM. HIST. REV. 1078, 1078-79 (1966) (reviewing
OTTO H. OLSEN, CARPETBAGGER'S CRUSADE: THE LIFE OF ALBION WINEGAR TOURGEE (1965)).
146 See generally Monte M. Olenick, Albion W. Tourgde: Radical Republican Spokesman of the
Civil War Crusade 23 PHYLON 332 (1962).
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and other white supremacists repeatedly threatened his life and ran him out
of the state in 1879.147 Tourg6e's eloquent and energetic advocacy of
equality was not silenced. 14 His novels such as A Fool's Errand, by One of
the Fools (1880) and Bricks Without Straw (1880) exposed the South's
continuing racial prison and pilloried the national, and particularly the
Republican Party's, retreat from real Reconstruction to assure the promises
of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Critical acclaim hailed
Tourg6e as the "Victor Hugo of America,"'149 in comparison to the great
French tragicomic, Romantic novelist, and poet who authored such classics
as Les Misirables (1880) and Notre Dame de Paris (1831), translated as
"The Hunchback of Notre Dame." 150
A prolific polemicist, Tourg6e's non-fiction was also pointed. His
1880 companion to Fool's Errand, titled Invisible Empire: A Concise
Review of the Epoch, with Many Thrilling Personal Narratives and Startling
Facts of Life at the South, Never Before Narrated for the General Reader, All
Fully Authenticated, revealed his talent at expos6,' 51 His profound advocacy
of equality showed in his 1892 pamphlet Is Liberty Worth Preserving?
52
Reflecting on the strength of Tourgde's writing, the Monitor
newspaper in Concord, New Hampshire, mused that "[i]t may be well to
inquire, in view of the power here displayed, whether the long-looked-for
native American novelist who is to rival Dickens, and equal Thackeray, and
yet imitate neither, has not been found."'153 Even some who disputed his
view acknowledged his talent: in commenting on Fool's Errand, the Raleigh
Observer, a leading newspaper in North Carolina's capital, declared it a
"powerfully written work, and destined, we fear, to do as much harm in the
world as 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' to which it is, indeed, a companion piece."'
5 4
Comparing the potential of Tourg6e's work with that of Harriet
Beecher Stowe was indeed powerful. Her Uncle Tom 's Cabin; or, Life
Among the Lowly aimed to "make this whole nation feel what an accursed
thing slavery is!"' 55 when it appeared serially in 1851-1852 in the
147 Theodore L. Gross, The Fool's Errand ofAlbion W. Tourgde, 19 PHYLON 240 (1963).
148 See George J. Becker, Albion W. Tourgie: Pioneer in Social Criticism, 19 AM. LITERATURE
59 (1947) (discussing some of Tourgde's works after his return to the North).
149 Archibald Henderson, Book Review, 9 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 247 (1922) (reviewing ROY
F. DIBBLE, ALBION W. TOURGtE (1921)).
Iso See generally ALBERT W. HALSALL, VICTOR HUGO AND THE ROMANTIC DRAMA (1998);
MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, VICTOR HUGO, A REALISTIC BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT ROMANTIC (1942).
151 ALBION WINEGAR TOURGIE, THE INVISIBLE EMPIRE (Louisiana State University Press 1989)
(1880).
152 ALBION WINEGAR TOURGtE, Is LIBERTY WORTH PRESERVING? (1892).
1 Henderson, supra note 149.
154 Id.
153 THOMAS F. GOSSETT, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN AND AMERICAN CULTURE 89-90 (1985) (quoting
a letter of Harriet's sister-in-law, Mrs. Edward Beecher).
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Washington, D.C., antislavery newspaper National Era.15 6 Many blessed or
cursed Stowe's work for achieving her aim, in at least the northern section of
the nation. 5 Comparing Tourg6e to the great, popular English novelist
Charles Dickens marked Tourg6e again for capturing the conscience of his
day, as Dickens did.'58 Similarly, the comparison to English novelist and
journalist William Makepeace Thackeray, best known for his novel Vanity
Fair (1847-1848), marked Tourg6e's ability to see social shortcomings. 5 9
Securing Tourg6e as counsel boosted the committee's cause because
the case would have a nationally recognized advocate.160 His counsel came
from afar, however: his law practice was located in western New York
State's Chautauqua County and he held a position as Honorary Professor of
Legal Ethics at Buffalo Law School.' 6 ' Therefore, the committee also
needed local counsel. 162  On 29 December 1891, it settled for James C.
Walker, an unheralded attorney in New Orleans who worked mostly criminal
matters and whom Martinet described to Tourgde as "a conscientious &
painstaking lawyer." 1
63
The committee wanted someone of more stature than Walker,
64
perhaps someone of the light-skinned elite, such as former Governor
Pinchback, or even another white advocate such as Thomas J. Semmes, 165 a
leader of the New Orleans bar and a former president of the American Bar
Association 166 founded in 1878 as the nation's premier voluntary association
of lawyers and judges.167 But means appeared to be a problem. "We do not
wish to obligate ourselves beyond our ability,"'168 Martinet cautioned.
Semmes reportedly required a $2500 retainer. 169 Pinchback's fee demands
probably also exceeded the committee abilities. 70 In any case he was soon
156 Id. at 147.
157 See EDMUND WILSON, PATRIOTIC GORE: STUDIES IN THE LITERATURE OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR 3-4 (1962); John R. Thompson, Uncle Tom's Cabin 18 S. LITERARY MESSENGER 630, 638
(1852).
158 See generally Michael Goldberg, From Bentham to Carlyle: Dickens' Political Development,
3 J. HIST. IDEAS 61, 61-76 (1972).
159 See generally JOHN REED, DICKENS AND THACKERAY: PUNISHMENT AND FORGIVENESS
(1995); BARBARA HARDY, THE EXPOSURE OF LUXURY: RADICAL THEMES IN THACKERAY (1972).
160 See generally Kaplan, supra note 26.
161 Id. at 129.





167 See ROBERT W. MESERVE, THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY AND
APPRECIATION (1973). See also EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
AND ITS WORK (1953).
168 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 30.
169 Id.
170 See HASKINS, supra note 22.
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to move from New Orleans to more lucrative practice in Washington, D.C. 7 '
So, the committee hired Walker for a fee of $1000.17'
Martinet and Walker each corresponded with Tourg6e on the
strategy to construct the committee's test case. 173 Their emerging plan fixed
color as a central element. As Plessy student Charles A. Lofgren
summarized, "setting up the case around a light-complexioned Negro, the
arbitrariness of the classification would be accentuated."' 174  Martinet
revealingly noted a significant tactical problem in the committee putting
forward a too white-looking colored person: no one might challenge the
person! Martinet observed that as far as the Crescent City and its environs,
"people of tolerably fair complexion, even if unmistakably colored, enjoy
here a large degree of immunity from the accursed prejudice."
75
Martinet's comment unveiled the fact that riding in whichever car he
or his confreres chose was not the driving concern in contesting Louisiana's
Separate Car Act of 1890,176 at least not for the light-skinned Creoles of
color who dominated the Comitg des Citoyens.'" They had choices and
options. Their color could shield them in significant part from segregation if
they so chose. Many could "pass," after all, crossing the color line as they
desired. 7 1 What they most desired, however, was legal recognition of their
identity. Their interest lay in neither disguise nor deception. Crucial to them
was the twist of law that had come to impose identity on them. They refused
the governing whites' effort to create individual identity and to straightjacket
all people into identities regardless of whether such identities differed from
or disrupted personal self-identity. From the outset, Martinet and Desdunes
had declared, "We'll make a case, a test case, and bring it before the Federal
171 FONER, supra note 89, at 127. Pinchback removed to the national capital in 1893 "and became
a prominent member of the Four Hundred, as the city's black elite was called. He was renowned for his
lavish entertainments and elegant demeanor." Id.
172 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 31.
173 See the letters from Martinet to Tourgde, dated 25 and 28 October 1891 and 7 and 28
December 1891, from Walker to Tourgde, dated 2 and 21 January 1892, 25 February 1892, and 14 March
1892, and from Tourgde to Walker, estimated by Lofgren as 14 January 1892. KELLER, supra note 25;
LOFGREN, supra note 4; Tourg6e Papers, supra note 25.
174 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 3 1.
175 Id.
176 1890 La. Acts 152.
177 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 31.
78 See. e.g., NELLA LARSEN, PASSING (1997) (illustrating passing); GRAHAM WATSON, PASSING
FOR WHITE: A STUDY OF RACIAL ASSIMILATION IN A SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOL (1970) (illustrating
passing under apartheid). See BERNARD W. BELL, THE AFRO-AMERICAN NOVEL AND ITS TRADITION 78,
91, 106-110 (1987) (discussing the history of the literary theme of blacks "passing" for white); JUDA
BENNETT, THE PASSING FIGURE; RACIAL CONFUSION IN MODERN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1996)
(exploring the social and cultural history of passing); PASSING THE FICTIONS OF IDENTITY (Elaine K.
Ginsberg ed., 1996) (focusing on the history of passing); WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOT WHITE
YET BOTH; THEMATIC EXPLORATIONS OF INTERRACIAL LITERATURE (1999) (exploring the theme of
passing); Sundquist, supra note 107, at 102-28 (discussing "passing" and its relation to the Plessy case).
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Courts."' 79 The ground they saw in July 1890-"the right [of] a person to
travel"' 8 -- was shifting to the right of a person to his essential self, to his
identity.
Martinet, Desdunes, and other members of the Comitd came to see
the test case they sought to construct as a challenge to the then constricting
socio-political process constructing race in a dichotomy of white and black,
or white and colored, or more essentially of white and not-white."' They
aimed to defy what they viewed as the absurd racial reductionism of the
Separate Car Act 8 2  and the white supremacist segregation such
reductionism represented.'83 Their own self-identities not merely challenged,
but confounded and subverted the dichotomous identity politics segregation
sought to secure. New Orleans's Creoles of color, and the population of
mixed blood that miscegenation had created throughout America,'1 4 stood as
a prism to reflect multiple, not dichotomous, categories of identity.
For many Creoles of color, their self-view represented identity as
changing and contingent, rather than as fixed and unitary. 8 1 Indeed, the
fluidity of identity ran fast in their view with how arbitrary and thin all
categories of race were. They opposed the collective collapsing of personal
identities into a binary color cluster. They refused the identity segregation
sought to impose on them, and they disputed the state's authority to use its
power to so intrude on their personal identity.
An irony of which Martinet and others of the Comitj were perhaps
unaware nevertheless irritated the lining of their emerging argument against
a dichotomous color hierarchy. From one perspective, the Creole argument
harkened back to antebellum distinctions that privileged the lighter-hued.
Not only in New Orleans, but particularly in Charleston, South Carolina,
Mobile, Alabama, and other cities with prominent mixed-blood communities,
the dominant society extended to lighter-skinned African-Americans
17 OLSEN, supra note 33, at 29 (quoting the NEW ORLEANS CRUSADER, July 19, 1890);
LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 29.
ISO LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 29.
'81 See GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE
SOUTH, 1890-1940 (1998).
182 1890 La. Acts 152.
183 See HALE, supra note 181.
1" See. e.g., Frederick Ludwig Hoffman, Race Amalgamation, in PLESSY V. FERGUSON: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 76-101 (Brook Thomas ed., 1997) (excerpting Frederick Ludwig Hoffman,
Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, in I 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATION 1 (Macmillan 1896), and noting that racial amalgamation, particularly between blacks and
whites, was an issue of the day). Hoffman's writing illustrates the so-called scientific racism of the day.
1SO See JOHN BLASSINGAME, BLACK NEW ORLEANS 1760-1880 (1973); DESDUNES, supra note
129 and accompanying text; Davis, supra note 63, at 152-176 (containing historic examples of Black
press); Henry Dethloff& Robert C. Jones, Race Relations in Louisiana 1877-1898, 9 LA. HIST. 311, 311-
14 (1968) (discussing Creoles).
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economic and social advantages the darker-skinned lacked. 8 6  Such
advantages occurred also in the countryside and on plantations. Being
lumped in a racial dichotomy thus denied what at least some mixed-bloods or
Creoles may have thought of as traditional privilege.1 17 In some ways then
they appeared less as transgressing traditional categories than as conserving
or preserving the complex subtlety of a mixed blood racial system that
slavery generated.1
88
While attacking the falsity of segregation's racial dichotomy,
Martinet and the Comitj stood, perhaps trapped, at the center of alternative
visions of identity in the hybrid of U.S. culture. While they mocked the
masquerade of color-consciousness, they were also models of color-
consciousness. They simultaneously evidenced the deprivation and privilege
in the continuity and change of a social system that distinguished among
blacks, whites, mulattoes, and the many gradations from quadroons to
octoroons, one that presumed to measure persons by blood.' 89
The metric was straightforward, if not simple. So-called pure-
blooded persons were either black or white. Those with one black parent and
one white parent were mulatto. Those with only white parents but one black
and three white grandparents (thus one-quarter black) were quadroon. Those
with only white parents and grandparents but with one black and seven white
great-grandparents (thus one-eighth black) were octoroon. Proportion of
"white" blood identified all.' 90
Recognized gradations were neither accidental nor incidental. In
such a scheme, attitudes on individual difference reflected fundamental racial
attitudes based on what anthropologist later termed hypo-descent.' 9' Blacks
186 See BERLIN, supra note 85 and accompanying text; Toplin, supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
1s7 See Edward Larocque Tinker, Cable and the Creoles, 5 AM. LIT. 313, 313-16 (1934). See
generally GEORGE WASHINGTON CABLE, THE GRANDISSIMES: A STORY OF CREOLE LIFE (C. Scribner's
Sons 1893); GEORGE WASHINGTON CABLE, THE CREOLES OF LOUISIANA (Scribners 1884) (discussing the
sensitivities and shadows of Creole New Orleans including the quadroons balls of the rue d'Orleans);
GEORGE WASHINGTON CABLE, OLD CREOLE DAYS (Scribners 1879); GRACE KING, CREOLE FAMILIES OF
NEW ORLEANS (Macmillian 1921); GRACE KING, NEW ORLEANS: THE PLACE AND THE PEOPLE
(Macmillan 1895).
'88 See CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE; SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN
BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES (1971). See also JUDITH R. BERZON, NEITHER WHITE NOR BLACK:
THE MULATTO CHARACTER IN AMERICAN FICTION (1978).
189 See DAVIS, supra note 105.
190 Id. See also Sidney Kaplan, The Octoroon: Early History of the Drama of Miscegenation 20
J. NEGRO EDUC. 547, 547-57 (1951).
191 See DAVIS, supra note 105, at 5 (describing hypo-descent as "meaning that racially mixed
persons are assigned to the status of the subordinate group"); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE, (college ed. 1964) ("The prefix Hypo derives from Greek and means under or
less than or beneath."). See also HOWARD M. BAHR, BRUCE A. CHADWICK, & JOSEPH H. STAUSS,
AMERICAN ETHNICITY 27-28 (1979); MELVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 56 (1964);
Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2067 (1993).
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lay beneath whites and weighed down descent, for the dominant society
deemed blacks the lower order. The epitome of hypo-descent became
popularly known as the one drop rule: Any African admixture created a
person of color. 192 Regardless of degree, the rule declared anyone with a
traceable African ancestor to be of African ancestry-in the language of
segregation and Louisiana's Separate Car Act, "colored."' 93
IV. TAKING COLOR To COURT: A FIRST TRIAL
To test the law of color, Rodolphe L. Desdunes offered up his
twenty-one-year-old son, Daniel F. Desdunes.194  An octoroon, Daniel
exactly fit the profile of person the Comitj wanted to present to the court.
He appeared indistinguishable from those called "white," and it was on that
appearance the Comit rested its case against the pivotal racial classifications
in Louisiana's Separate Car Act. 95 Who was to say what Daniel's identity
was? That was the central question the Comit6 wanted decided-not merely
by a local court, but by the nation's highest court. 96
Working with Walker and Tourg6e, the Comitj carefully
orchestrated Daniel Desdunes's arrest on 24 January 1892 for violating
Louisiana's Separate Car Act' 97 by boarding a Louisville and Nashville
Railroad (L & N) train with a first-class ticket for passage from New Orleans
to Mobile and then taking a seat in a car reserved for whites only.'98
Everything was prearranged. Indeed, getting the action underway required
some collusion at least to alert an L & N conductor to identify the
indistinguishable Daniel Desdunes as not "white" and to proceed with his
arrest.' 99 The senior Desdunes no doubt worried about his son's safety.
Martinet early insisted on crafting a scenario "without personal danger."2°°
He and perhaps others on the Comitg negotiated with L & N managers to
agree on details for a danger-free arrest and complaint filing that would
secure the essential elements of the test case being created.
The railroad officials eagerly agreed to work with the Comiti. "The
roads are not in favor of the separate car law owing to the expense entailed,"
192 See DAVIS, supra note 105, at 4-6 (defining the "one drop rule").
193 1890 La. Acts 152.
194 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 33.
195 1890 La. Acts 152.
196 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 31-32.
197 1890 La. Acts 152.
198 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 32-33.
I" Id. at 31-32.
200 See the letter from Martinet to Tourgde, dated 5 October 1891. KELLER, supra note 25;
LOFGREN, supra note 4; Tourgde Papers, supra note 25.
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Martinet explained to Tourgte in December 1891201 The L & N and other
lines feared public backlash if they directly opposed the law, and they
appeared delighted to let the Comitd carry the load against the act while
allowing their hands in the matter to remain unseen. So the Comit was
assured of L & N's cooperation and especially that the confrontation and
arrest of the Comitg's proxy would occur without "force or violen[ce]. 20 2
Daniel F. Desdunes acted out the script Walker and Tourge
carefully drafted to carry forward State v. Desdunes2 °3 in the Orleans Parish
Criminal District Court. His plea challenged the Separate Car Act °4 for
violating the U.S. Constitution on multiple grounds.20 ' To start, using a clear
Fourteenth Amendment approach, Desdunes averred that he was a U.S.
citizen and argued that Louisiana unconstitutionally had moved to "make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States" 20 6 and used race to condition his rights by directing it to
be the basis for refusal of service on a common carrier.
Invoking the Commerce Clause,20 7 Desdunes pled further that the
common carrier in his case (L & N) engaged in interstate traffic. That
character, he argued, put it beyond the state's authority, as the U.S. Supreme
Court had decided in 1877 in Hall v. DeCuir,28 which also arose in
Louisiana. In DeCuir, the Court held unconstitutional an 1869 Louisiana
statute209 "requiring those engaged in inter-state commerce to give all
persons travelling in that state, upon the public conveyances employed in
such business, equal rights and privileges in all parts of the conveyance,
without distinction or discrimination on account of race or color."2 0 The
Court held that the 1869 act directly interfered with, and imposed a direct
burden on, interstate commerce. Desdunes's pleadings invoked the DeCuir
argument against the 1890 act.2"
Desdunes's pleadings treating transportation law retraced a line of
cases reaching back before the Civil War2t 2 and included the Civil Rights
201 id.
202 id.
203 See Desdunes Case File, supra note 30.
204 1890 La. Acts 152.
205 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 35 (summarizing the "central constitutional argument"). See
also Desdunes Case File, supra note 30.
206 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
207 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
208 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
209 An Act to Enforce the Thirteenth Article of the Constitution of this State, and to Regulate the
Licenses Mentioned in Said Thirteenth Article, 1869 La. Acts 37. See also LA. CONST. art. XIII (1869)
(providing that that "All persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any conveyance of a public
character").
210 Hall, 95 U.S. at 487.
211 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 35.
211 Hall, 95 U.S. at 487-91.
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Cases of 1883,213 in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the anti-
discrimination, public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1875.214 But in treating Louisiana's use of race in its 1890 Separate Car
Act,215 the Desdunes pleadings reached out further to fresh grounds
regarding racial identity.
Pointing to section two of the 1890 act,2 16 Desdunes challenged the
state's authority to delegate any power to determine racial identity.217 By
what authority could a train conductor or other private person act with
official state sanction to decide a passenger's race? Determining race was "a
scientific and legal question of great difficulty, 218 the pleadings stated. Such
identity was at least a question for judicial determination. Louisiana's Act to
allow a non-judicial process, indeed the musing of mere private persons or
even such as might be deputized for the purpose, to decree racial identity
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's ban that "[n]o state ... shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"21 9 the
pleadings argued. Moreover, the Act's provision for criminal penalties
amounted, in the defendant's view, to "the imposition of punishment without
process of law and the denial to Citizens of the United States of the equal
protection of the laws."2 °
The Desdunes pleadings aimed only "to prepare a basis" for the full
argument Tourgde, Walker, and the Comitd were working to offer.22' How
the full argument would have unfolded in State v. Desdunes remained only
for speculation, however, for the case failed to develop as the Comitd
desired.222 On 25 May 1892, the Louisiana Supreme Court short-circuited it
by deciding Abbott v. Hicks,223 a challenge to the 1890 Separate Car Act
224
brought by a group of blacks unrelated to the Comiti.
225
Martinet, the junior and senior Desdunes, and their confreres were
not the only ones working against the statute. A group that attorney Percy
Roberts represented 226 beat the Comit6 to court. Aiming at segregation
without aiming to reach the law's implications for identity, the challenge in
213 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
214 Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 8 Stat. 335 (1875).
215 1890 La. Acts 152.
216 Id.
217 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 35 (summarizing the "central constitutional argument").
218 Id.
219 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
220 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 35.
221 Id.
222 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 32-35.
223 Abbot v. Hicks, I I So. 74 (La. 1892).
224 1890 La. Acts 152.
225 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 40-41.
226 Abort, II So. at 74.
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Abbott 27 rested solely on Commerce Clause grounds that the U.S. Supreme
Court indicated in Hall v. Decuir228 in holding unconstitutional the 1869
Louisiana anti-discrimination in public accommodations statute.
229
Interstate character was the determinative point Roberts argued in
Abbott.23 The black passenger admitted into the Texas & Pacific Railway
Company car reserved for whites was, Roberts showed, "an interstate
passenger, that is, a passenger traveling from a point in the State of Louisiana
to his destination in the State of Texas. 23' On the basis of the uncontested
fact of the interstate character of the passenger and of the carrier, Louisiana's
Supreme Court heeded the lessons taught in its reversal in the Hall v. Decuir
case. 232 It also heeded the instruction in the federal high Court's more recent
pronouncement on 3 March 1890 in Louisville, New Orleans and Texas
Railway Company v. Mississippi233 that a state separate car statute could
"appl[y] solely to commerce within the State. '234
Reviewing the state's Separate Car Act then, the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that "the statute has no application to interstate passengers, or if it
has, that it is, as to them, unconstitutional and void." That undercut the
Comiti's developing case in State v. Desdunes.235 In fact, no substantive
case remained. The state's high court had declared void an aspect of the act
on which the Comitd premised its case. His carefully orchestrated arrest on
24 January 1892 put Daniel Desdunes in exactly the character considered in
Abbott: his first-class ticket on the L & N from New Orleans, Louisiana, to
Mobile, Alabama, made him "an interstate passenger, that is, a passenger
traveling from a point in the State of Louisiana to his destination in [another
227 Id.
228 Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485,485 (1877).
229 Abbot v. Hicks, II So. 74,76 (La. 1892).
230 Id. at 74-75.
231 Id. at 74.
232 Hall, 95 U.S. at 485.
233 Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587 (1890), aff'g 6 So. 203
(1889) (upholding as valid 1888 Miss. Laws 48, which provided, "That all railroads carrying passengers
in this State (other than street railroads) shall provide equal, but separate, accommodation for the white
and colored races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the
passenger cars by a partition, so as to secure separate accommodations"). In light of Hall, the Mississippi
Supreme Court, as Justice David J. Brewer put it for the affirming U.S. Supreme Court majority,
held that the statute applied solely to commerce within the state; and that
construction being the construction of the statute of the state by its highest court,
must be accepted as conclusive here. If it be a matter respecting wholly commerce
within a state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then,
obviously, there is no violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitution.
Id. at 591.
234 Id.
235 See Desdunes Case File, supra note 30.
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state]"236 on an interstate carrier.237 On 9 July 1892, newly installed Criminal
District Court Judge John H. Ferguson without opinion essentially dismissed
the state's case against Daniel Desdunes.238
V. PLESSY GOES TO COURT IN LOUISIANA
The Comitg needed a new case. The turn in State v. Desdunes
239
deflated enthusiasm among those who poured so much into making the
effort. In fact, eyeing the prospect of a fresh case to reach the ends originally
hoped for, Martinet confided, "I do not entertain the same favorable results
as hopefully as in the Desdunes [case] .',24 The senior Desdunes again
secured a proxy-a thirty year-old 241 Creole of color shoemaker of his
acquaintance who was, like the junior Desdunes, visually indistinguishable
from whites. The man's name was Homer Adolph Plessy, and the Comitj
put him on a road to the U.S. Supreme Court in June 1892, even before the
Desdunes case officially closed.242
On Tuesday, 7 June 1892, on the Comiti's instruction, Plessy
purchased an East Louisiana Railway (ELR) ticket for first-class passage
from New Orleans to Covington, Louisiana. The two-hour trip, wholly
within Louisiana, followed a circuitous seventy-mile route that Lake
Pontchartrain's six hundred square miles then imposed on land passage from
the Crescent City on its south shore to its north side where Covington sat as
the line moved west from Slidell, Pearl River, Hickory, and Abita Springs.
243
Plessy boarded the scheduled 4:15 p.m. train at the Press Street
station and sought to enter a coach reserved for whites on the wholly
intrastate ELR.244 He had no intention of taking the ride. His script called
for his not leaving New Orleans. As with Daniel Desdunes's arrest almost
six months earlier, the Comiti carefully orchestrated Plessy's confrontation.
It arranged to identify Plessy for ELR conductor J. J. Dowling and to have
236 Abbott v. Hicks, 11 So. 74, 74-75 (La. 1892).
237 Id.
238 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 40 n.21.
239 See Desdunes Case File, supra note 30.
240 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 40 n.21 (observing that while the letter is dated 4 July, "its
composition continued in stages through 29 August").
241 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 41 (describing Plessy as "a thirty-four-year-old" at the time of
his arrest even though Plessy was born in March 1862). Thus, Plessy was thirty years old at the time of
his arrest in June 1892 and thirty-four years old when the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its opinion in
1896. See TIMES PICAYUNE, Mar. 4, 1925, at 8 (printing Plessy's obituary and stating, "Plessy-on
Sunday, March 1, 1925, at 5:10 a.m., Homey A. Plessy, 63 years, beloved husband of Louise
Bordenave"). See also Keith Weldon Medley, The Sad Story of How 'separate but equal' was Born,
SMITHSONIAN, Feb. 1994, at 117 (quoting Plessy's obituary).
242 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 41.
243 See generally Medley, supra note 241.
244 See LOGREN, supra note 4, at 41.
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New Orleans Detective Chris C. Cain on hand to take Plessy into custody on
Dowling's complaint that Plessy refused the conductor's command under the
Separate Car Act2 41 to remove himself from the car reserved for whites only.
The script played out perfectly. Cain arrested Plessy and took him
for booking at New Orleans's Fifth Precinct Station on Elysian Fields
Avenue about a half-mile from the Press Street station. The criminal
complaint Cain filed charged Plessy with having "unlawfully, insisted on
going into a coach to which, by race, he did not belong. ' 246 If found guilty,
Plessy faced a fine of twenty-five dollars or not more than twenty days in the
parish prison.247
Walker guided Plessy on the path tested earlier with Daniel
Desdunes.2 4' He interposed a plea to jurisdiction on 20 July, answering the
information filed against Plessy by arguing that the Orleans Parish Criminal
District Court lacked authority in the case because the Separate Car Act
2 49
violated the U.S. Constitution. Judge John H. Ferguson overruled Plessy's
jurisdictional plea and ordered Plessy to plead to the facts in the information.
As directed by counsel, Plessy refused to plead to the facts. In fact, he
declined to state his race; he neither admitted nor denied he was colored or
white.250 Judge Ferguson warned Plessy that he faced fine or imprisonment
unless either a writ of prohibition or certiorari arrested judgment and in
effect sustained his constitutional argument against the statute.
251
Walker, Tourgre, and the Comitg took heart. The proceedings were
going as they planned. They had properly pled the statute's
unconstitutionality and been overruled, which allowed them to take Plessy's
case to Louisiana's Supreme Court on a writ of prohibition, as had occurred
in Abbott v. Hicks.252 And they did so, moving against the trial court judge,
John H. Ferguson. The question then, in the words of the state high court
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, was "whether the judge [Ferguson] is
245 1890 La. Acts 152.
246 Affidavit of C. C. Cain, Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. 948 (La. 1892) (No. 11,134) (on file with
Archives and Manuscripts Division, Archives of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, Earl K.
Long Library, University of New Orleans); Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 951 (La. 1892).
247 See 1890 La. Acts 152, 153.
248 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 40.
249 1890 La. Acts 152.
250 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 6-7.
251 See State v. Plessy, No. 19,117 (Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans 1892) (photocopy
available in the Amistad Research Center, New Orleans); LOFGREN supra note 4, at 41. See State v.
Plessy, No. 19,117 (Criminal District Court, Parish of Orleans 1892), and Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948 (La.
1892), for details on proceedings reported here and above. See also LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 28-42.
Notice that neither the information nor the plea averred Plessy's race or color. See Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896).
252 Abbott v. Hicks, I I So. 74 (La. 1892).
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exceeding the bounds of judicial power by entertaining a prosecution for a
crime not created by law.,
3
2
In Ex parte Plessy,5 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court responded to
Plessy's "plea of the unconstitutionality of the statute., 255 It dismissed as
"argumentative, 256 most of Walker and Tourg6e's fourteen-point petition for
Plessy. Justice Charles Fenner summarized the petition in his opinion for the
unanimous court. The "whole gravamen of [Plessy's] plea" was, Justice
Fenner wrote,
[t]hat the statute in question establishes an insidious distinction and
discrimination between citizens of the United States, based on
race, which is obnoxious to the fundamental principles of national
citizenship, perpetuates involuntary servitude, as regards citizens
of the colored race, under the merest pretense of promoting the
comforts of passengers on railway trains, and in further respects
abridges the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United
States, and the rights secured by the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments of the federal constitution.
25 7
Justice Fenner then barely paused in dismissing each element of the plea's
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
The Separate Car Act259 was a legitimate "exercise of the police
power -the residual, sovereign right of the state to act "in the interest of
public order, peace, and comfort,, 26 Justice Fenner explained. Repeating the
prevailing doctrine of the day that equal application satisfied the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 262 Justice Fenner declared
that the segregation act "impairs no right of passengers of either race, who
are secured that equality of accommodations which satisfies every reasonable
claim. ,
263
Justice Fenner went further to insist that race was a legitimate basis
for governmental distinctions. The principle permeated the law, not only in
Louisiana but throughout the United States. Justice Fenner noted that "[t]o
hold that the requirement of separate, though equal, accommodations in
253 Exparte Plessy, I I So. 948, 948 (La. 1892).
254 Id.




259 1890 La. Acts 152.
260 Expare Plessy, 11 So. 948,951 (La. 1892).
261 Id.
262 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
263 Plessy, I I So. at 951.
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public conveyances, violated the Fourteenth Amendment, would, on the
same principles, necessarily entail the nullity of statutes establishing separate
schools, and of others, existing in many states, prohibiting intermarriage
between the races.,
264
If race was not a legitimate basis for any one legal distinction, then it
was not a legitimate basis for any legal distinction, the court agreed. With an
eye on broad-based segregation, it recognized that "[a]ll are regulations
based upon difference of race; and, if such difference cannot furnish a basis
for such legislation in one of these cases, it cannot in any. '"265 Thus, the
Louisiana high court ruled the state's Separate Car Act of 1890266
constitutional and denied Plessy relief from criminal prosecution.267
The result was exactly as Tourg6e, Walker, and the Comitg had
hoped. The highest court in the state had issued a final ruling. That enabled
an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. From the beginning the
nation's highest court was the desired forum for the Comitg's argument on
race and color as bases for legal discrimination.268
VI. PLESSY GOES TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
The test case that the ComitM des Citoyens developed against
Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890269 touched and concerned many
issues-many discussed in depth long afterward.270 Central to the Comiti's
concerns were its much less discussed ideas and theories that individual
identity lay as the abused core of its case. In the two briefs that the Comitj
caused to be filed in the U.S. Supreme Court during the October 1895 term
for Plessy as plaintiff in error against Judge John H. Ferguson, 271 race and
color as elements of identity figured as fundamental constructs of the
arguments. A persistent question echoed throughout: Who has authority to
decide a person's identity?
The two briefs appeared to arise from arrangements Tourg6e made to
sign on as co-counsel for the U.S. Supreme Court argument his long-time
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 1890 La. Acts 152.
267 Ex parte Plessy, I 1 So. 948,951 (La. 1892).
268 Id. at 80-82; LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 43.
269 1890 La. Acts 152.
270 See LOFGREN. supra note 4, at 1-60.
271 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 3-80. Tourg6e and Walker appeared on one brief with
Walker's name alone on the cover as "Of Counsel for Plaintiff in Error," id. at 27, but "ALBION W.
TOURGEE, of Counsel for Plaintiff in Error" appeared as the sign off, id. at 63. "Brief of James C.
Walker" also appears. Id. at 64-80. S. F. Phillips and F. D. McKenney appeared on the lead brief as
"Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error." Id. at 3.
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friend, 7 2 former U.S. Solicitor General Samuel F. Phillips.2 73 A veteran of
battle in the nation's high court, Phillips had argued (unsuccessfully at it
turned out) for the U.S. government in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883274 to
uphold the anti-discrimination, public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.275 Tourgde eagerly drew on Phillips's experience
and on his practicing in the nation's capital where he could oversee details
such as printing and filing the briefs. Much as Walker served as local
counsel to be on the ground in New Orleans, Phillips was local counsel in
Washington, D.C., preparing the Plessy case for the high Court. Thus,
Phillips and his law partner F. D. McKenney276 appeared on the lead brief as
"Attorneys for Plaintiff in Error., 277  Tourgde and Walker appeared on a
second brief with Walker's name alone on the cover as "Of Counsel for
Plaintiff in Error.,
278
The Phillips brief attended mostly to arguing that Louisiana's
Separate Car Act of 1890279 violated "[t]he XlVth Amendment, by abridging
the privileges and immunities of Plessy in his character as a citizen of the
United States. ' 280  Emphasizing injury, inequity, and the right to travel,
Phillips declared in summary:
we submit that the separation required by the statute is necessarily
in the nature of mayhem of a right to move about this country quite
inseparable from any proper definition of the term "citizen of the
United States," or from any proper catalogue of his privileges. No
statute can be constitutional which requires a citizen of the United
States to undergo policing founded upon Color at every time that
intra-state occasions require him to use a railroad-a policing, that
is, which reminds him that by law he is either of a superior or an
inferior class of citizens. As already suggested, either
classification is per se offensive, and technically an injury to any
citizen of the United States as such.28'
Right of transit more than race lay as the foundation of the Phillips brief.
2 2
272 Tourgde probably became acquainted with Phillips during their post Civil War years in North
Carolina. Phillips served as a delegate to the North Carolina constitutional convention in 1865. See J. G.
DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA 120-21 (1906).
273 LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 148.
274 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
275 Civil Rights Act of 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
276 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 245 n.37.
277 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 3.
278 Id. at 27.
279 1890 La. Acts 152.
280 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 9. See also. LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 164-72.
281 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 15.
282 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 164-72 (discussing Phillips's brief).
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Directed apparently by Tourg6e to discuss the color issue, Phillips
appeared either unable or unwilling to embrace 283 the core argument that
Tourg6e, Walker, and the Comitg had been developing about the invalidity of
race and color as legally recognizable facts. Rather, Phillips's argument
accepted the fact of race and color but disputed the consequence the fact of
race and color could constitutionally have in law. "The record of the
information does not show whether Plessy is White or Colored,284 Phillips
noted. He took the information's failure to show race or color as an
opportunity to argue in the alternative for Plessy that "it may be that at the
time alleged he was a White man insisting upon a seat ... or, vice versa, a
Colored man insisting upon a seat."285 That race or color were indeterminate
did not enter his argument. Phillips's point was "that it is not competent for
a statute to give force of law to mere social inequalities turning upon
Color. 28 6 More fully stated, Phillips submitted to the Court "that for citizens
of the United States any State statute is unconstitutional that attempt, because
of personal Color to hinder, even if by insult alone, travel along highways,
between any points whatever.
287
The Walker-Tourg6e brief reached the race or color issue in its
opening assignment of errors.288 Its first point on the issue was that
Louisiana's law itself left race and color indefinite: "Neither the said statute,
nor the law of the state of Louisiana, nor the decision of its courts have
defined the terms 'colored race' and 'persons of color,"' the brief stated.289
Then, as in the pleadings in State v. Desdunes, Walker and Tourg6e attached
their challenge to the fact that "the law in question has delegated to
conductors of railway trains the right to make such classification and made
penal a refusal to submit to their decision., 290 They next made the point that
"[r]ace is a question of law and fact which an officer of a railroad corporation
cannot be authorized to determine. 29' In the last of their total of twelve
enumerated assignment of errors, they concluded that "[tihe state had no
power to authorize the officers of railway trains to determine the question of
race without testimony, and to make the rights and privileges of citizens to
depend on such decision, or to compel the citizen to accept and submit to
283 See Raymond Wolters, Segregation, Integration, and Pluralism: Approaches to American
Race Relations, 29 HIST. EDUC. Q. 123, 124 (1989) (discussing Phillips's acceptance of elements of racial
segregation in anti-miscegenation laws and in separate school laws).
284 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 9.
285 Id.
286 Id.
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such decision. '2 92 Absence of fixed legal standards, improper delegation,
and lack of due process invalidated the statute, the brief argued.
In elaborating on the questions arising in the case, the Walker-
Tourg6e brief went directly to determination of race. It posed the ultimate
question toward which its argument tended: "Has the State the power under
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, to make a distinction
based on color in the enjoyment of chartered privileges within the state?
293
Leading to that question, Walker and Tourg6e repeated their questions of
delegation and, most significantly, of determination. "Is the officer of a
railroad competent to decide the question of race? Is it a question that can be
determined in the absence of statutory definition and without evidence?
2 94
In rhetorical form, Walker and Tourg6e offered the essence of the argument
they and the Comiti had labored to deliver: "Is not the question of race,
scientifically considered, very often impossible of determination?,
295
Who was to tell who was who? Who was to determine identity?
And who was to bear whatever liability attached to mis-identifying a person?
Those questions persisted throughout the Walker-Tourgde brief, although in
more ponderous legal language. Attaching the liability question to questions
of source of identity, Walker and Tourg6e rhetorically asked, "Has the State
the power under the Constitution to authorize any officer of a railroad to put
a passenger off the train and refuse to carry him because he happens to differ
with the officer as to the race to which he properly belongs? ' 296  The
argument for Plessy was clearly that, if anything, law must privilege self-
identification.
Calling clearly for judicial notice of what they described as the
"mixed community" 297 represented in the Comiti and its proxy Plessy,
Walker and Tourgde emphasized the absence of fixed standards. "Our
contention is that no individual or corporation could be expected or induced
to carry into effect this law, in a community where race admixture is a
frequent thing and where the hazard of damage resulting from such
assignment is very great, 2 98 they stated. Miscegenation was a fact. "It is,"
they argued, "a question for the Court to determine upon its knowledge of
human nature and the condition affecting human conduct."'2 99
Along with the fact of miscegenation, Walker and Tourg6e argued
also that "in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 32-33.
295 Id. at 33.
296 Id.
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dominant race, in this instance the white race, is property, in the same sense
that a right of action or of inheritance is property." 00 Also, the reputation
attached to identity had "actual pecuniary value'0'0 of which mis-
identification deprived a person, the brief insisted. The property argument
reached to attach the identity elements to the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.30 2 It cast racial misidentification under Louisiana's Separate





Walker and Tourgde's argument that race mattered-as reputation
and as property-was at least awkward. Their tact pushed them, if not
simultaneously then alternately, to admit race as a fact and to deny race as a
fact. On denial, they reflected the cultural claims of their de facto client-
the Comitg des Citoyens with its roots in the history and hubris of New
Orleans's Creoles of color. Walker and Tourg6e wrote directly that
plaintiff also insists that a wholesale assortment of the citizens of
the United States, resident in the state of Louisiana, on the line of
race, is a thing wholly impossible to be made, equitably and justly
by any tribunal, much less by the conductor of a train without
evidence, investigation or responsibility. °5
Finally, Walker and Tourg6e came to the Comitm's core point. It was
not that the train conductor could not distinguish "on the line of race." Such
distinction was "a thing wholly impossible to be made, equitably and justly
by any tribunal." 30 6  Again, appealing to admission of reality, Plessy's
attorneys wrote,
The Court will take notice of the fact that, in all parts of the
country, race-intermixture has proceeded to such an extent that
there are great numbers of citizens in whom the preponderance of
the blood of one race or another, is impossible of ascertainment,
except by careful scrutiny of the pedigree.0 7
"Careful scrutiny of the pedigree" of persons was not where the Comitd or
Walker and Tourgde wanted to rest their argument, however. They wanted
to push further into appearance and individuality. For, the Plessy brief
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
303 1890 La. Acts 152.
304 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.




Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J[
continued, "even if it were possible to determine preponderance of blood and
so determine racial character in certain cases, what should be said of those
cases in which the race admixture is equal. Are they white or colored?
30 8
Here in full was the Comiti's identity issue represented in the person
of Homer Adolph Plessy. On instruction, he declined to identify himself by
race in Louisiana's trial court. In his petition for re-hearing he described
himself as "of mixed Caucasian and African blood, in the proportion of one-
eighth African and seven-eights Caucasian. 30 9 His brief by Walker and
Tourg6e to the Supreme Court added, "the African admixture not being
perceptible. 310 So, what was Plessy-and by extension his confreres in the
Comit? To repeat the question from the brief: "Are they white or
colored? 311 Moreover, who was to decide?
Spotlighting Plessy to leave no shadow on their point, Walker and
Tourg6e, asked what their client's crime was. "The crime ... for which he
became liable to imprisonment so far as the court can ascertain," they argued,
"was that a person of seven-eighths Caucasian blood insisted in sitting
peacefully and quietly in a car the state of Louisiana had commanded the
company set aside exclusively for the white race. 3 12 Focusing attention
fully then on the identity issue, they continued, "Where on earth should he
have gone? Will the court hold that a single drop of African blood is
sufficient to color a whole ocean of Caucasian whiteness?
313
"There is no law of the United States, or of the State of Louisiana
defining the limits of race-who are white and who are 'colored'? By what
rule then shall any tribunal be guided in determining racial character,
3 1 4
Walker and Tourg6e asked in their rhetorical style. "It may be said that all
those should be classed as colored in whom appears a visible admixture of
colored blood. By what law? With what justice?3 15 they asked.
Hypodescent extended the law of slavery, Walker and Tourg6e
argued. They again asked rhetorically, "Why not count every one as white in
whom is visible any trace of white blood? 3 16 "There is but one reason to
wit, the domination of the white race,3 1 7 they explained. "Slavery not only
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that institution. The trace of color raised the presumption of bondage,
3' 8
they noted. "The law in question is an attempt to apply this rule to the
establishment of legalized caste-distinction among citizens,"a 9 they insisted.
As such, it was both "a badge of servitude"a2 -- an "essential concomitant of
slavery, 3 21 that the Thirteenth Amendment 22 outlawed-and a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment command that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
3 23
Walker and Tourgie made plain that their argument's focus fell
against the state's authority to impose racial identity. They opposed the state
assigning, categorizing, classifying, or grouping persons on the basis of race,
which they insisted was indistinct. "The gist of our case is the
unconstitutionality of the assortment; not the question of equal
accommodation," they declared.324 To be sure, they offered what they
conceded were tried-and-failed equal accommodation arguments,325 but they
turned those with their new twist of identity that animated the ComitM and the
Creoles of color, whom they represented. "The question is not as to the
equality of the privileges enjoyed," Walker and Tourg6e emphasized for their
client, "but the right of the State to label one citizen as white and another as
colored.
326
Who was to say what Plessy's race was, so determining his identity
and deciding on that basis what rights and privileges he was to have?
Attacking the criminal penalty Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890327
imposed, Walker and Tourg6e argued further that "[t]he crime assigned
depends not on the quality of the act, but on the color of the skin.' 32' The
criminal liability arose from nothing touching or concerning "equal but
318 Id.
319 id.
320 Id. at 30.
321 Id. at 37.
322 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I.
323 Id.
324 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 56.
325 Id. See the assignment of errors, id. at 30-31. See also the focus on the equality of
accommodations argument in the Phillips brief, id. at 3-26.
326 Id.
327 1890 La. Acts 152.
328 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 57.
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separate,0 29 the attorney argued, quoting the statute.330  "The question of
equality of accommodation cannot arise on the trial of a presentment under
this statute, 3 31 they explained. "Equal or not equal," 332 that was not the
question. The information charging Plessy "asserted that he did not belong
to the same race as the coach3 33 in which he chose to ride, the attorneys
noted. "It does not appear to what race he belonged,"3 34 they emphasized.
There, the argument came full circle. The crime for which Plessy
stood charged turned on his identity. More precisely, it turned on
determination of his identity. Walker and Tourg6e suggested, but never
directly stated, the proposition that Plessy or any other citizen or person had
a constitutional right to self-identification. Their argument only denied "the
right of the State to label one citizen as white and another as colored.
335
Race was indeterminate and indistinct-at least in Louisiana, they insisted.
"There is no law of the United States, or of the State of Louisiana defining
the limits of race-who are white and who are 'colored, ' '3 36 Plessy's counsel
impressed on the Court.
The conclusion Plessy's counsel sought was that the Separate Car
Act of 1890, 33 7 "Act 111 of the Legislature of 1890, of the State of Louisiana
is null and void,"'338 and was "a violation of the fundamental principles of all
free government, ' 39 more particularly of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE STATE AND RACIAL IDENTITY IN PLESSY
Walker and Tourg6e's arguments elaborated two distinct theories
against Louisiana's "statutory assortment of the people of a state on the line
of race.3 40 Both theories turned on state action-"statutory assortment"34 1_
on the basis of racial identity. "The gist of our case is the unconstitutionality
of the assortment," they argued.342 Their two theories were discrimination
and indeterminacy.
329 1890 La. Acts 152.
330 See LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 57 (stating that "the criminal liability of the
individual is not affected by the inequality of accommodations").
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. (emphasis in original).
334 Id.
335 Id. at 56.
336 Id. at 38.
33 1890 La. Acts 152.
338 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 58.
339 Id. at 63.
340 Id. at 33.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 56.
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The first challenged that "assortment of the citizens on the line of
race was a discrimination intended to humiliate and degrade the former
subject and dependent class-an attempt to perpetuate the caste distinctions
on which slavery rested. 3 43  The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment
made such discrimination unconstitutional, Walker and Tourgre argued. In
deciding Plessy v. Ferguson,3 4 the U.S. Supreme Court voted seven to one
to reject the discrimination theories, which in time became the headline of
the case and what it stood for in constitutional law.345
The second theory posited that race was in fact indeterminate as a
matter of science and law. "Is not the question of race, scientifically
considered, very often impossible of determination? 346 Walker and Tourgre
asked in their rhetorical style. "Is not the question of race, legally
considered, one impossible to be determined, in the absence of statutory
definition? 3 47 they added. The necessary element of indeterminacy in racial
identity failed to make headway, however, with the Court in 1896 and in the
line of cases that followed.348
Indeed, the indeterminacy theory along with the identity basis of the
discrimination theory virtually vanished beneath discussion of the Plessy
case as a failed sortie against segregation. Focus on the legal construction of
racial separation eclipsed attention on the legal construction of race. Yet the
legal construction of race stood as the core of plaintiff in error Plessy's
arguments.
The Comiti des Citoyens worked with Walker and Tourgre for more
than three years in developing the Plessy case to challenge the legal
construction race as a category of fact. They opposed a law of dichotomous
division that delineated unmistakable types on supposed racial bases.
Rather, they argued for a view of humanity as a "mixed community, ' 349 as an
open continuum, not two clumps of closed categories. They offered the
person of Plessy (as they had first offered Daniel F. Desdunes) 350 as physical,
tangible evidence for inspection on the issue of whether race was a clear
matter of fact in a set of fixed, mutually exclusive categories. In their view
Plessy embodied the reality of "admixture not being perceptible.
351
343 Id. at 63.
3" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
35 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 3-6, 196-208 (introducing the themes of Plessy and discussing
its irrort for the future).
46 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 33.
347 Id.
349 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 3-6, 196-208 (discussing the influence of the Plessy decision).
349 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 35.
350 See LOFGREN, supra note 4, at 33.
351 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 30.
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The racial identity arguments in the Plessy case were perhaps
difficult for most minds at the time to grasp. They challenged popular
attitudes and dominant understandings of the day (and later).5 2 And perhaps
the arguments were not advocated directly enough. Walker and Tourg~e
approached their central argument mostly by tangents. They offered scant, if
any, constitutional basis to support their theory that racial identity was
indeterminate. Their discrimination argument reached clearly back to the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. But to where did their
indeterminacy argument reach? They argued essentially for a rule of reason.
Their rhetorical questions on race and color all tended to the same point:
look at the reality of appearance. They spotlighted Creoles of color, persons
of "mixed community. 35 3 Plessy was their prime example. He stood as a
citizen "of mixed Caucasian and African blood, in the proportion of one-
eighth African and seven-eighths Caucasian, the African admixture not being
perceptible. 35 4 What was the identity of persons such as Plessy? Walker
and Tourg~e asked in their rhetorical style, "Are they white or colored?" 3"
At most, their argument supplied ambivalent answers.
Walker and Tourgde's indeterminacy theory-and perhaps the
thinking of their real clients in interest, the ComitM and the Creoles of color
they represented-was itself uncertain. It rejected the racial dichotomy of
black and white. It focused, however, on the opposition (or non-opposition)
of the binary subclasses. At least tacitly it accepted the reality of the black
and white subclasses. It posited that the black and white subclasses were not
always exclusive and that they were not all-inclusive. The Walker-Tourg~e
theory insisted that black and white were not the only subclasses and that
there was at least another category or a range of categories mixing black and
white, even unto a degree that made "the African admixture not . . .
perceptible. 
3 56
Such a theory lay exposed to risk along multiple lines of alternative
explanation. It argued a point of law and a matter of fact. It insisted that the
binary black/white system Louisiana imposed in its 1890 Separate Car Act35 7
could not as a matter of law reasonably apply to racially mixed persons such
a Plessy who appeared white. Why? Because the act made no category for
persons such as Plessy, Walker and Tourgee suggested. But such an
352 See, e.g., Frederick Ludwig Hoffman, Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro, in
II PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION I (Macmillan 1896) (discussing attitudes
and understandings of racial identity of the day). See also Hoffman, supra note 184.
353 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 35.
334 Id. at 30.
355 Id. at 37.
356 Id. at 30.
357 1890 La. Acts 152.
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approach abandoned whether Plessy was within a statutory category to
become a question of fact-at least as the law recognized it.
Two immediately apparent replies were available to rebut Walker
and Tourg6e's argument. One reply allowed Plessy to win the battle in court
but lose the war at home, as it allowed the Louisiana legislature to redeem
the statute by amending it or by otherwise explicitly providing for persons of
"mixed community '358 within the separation scheme-assuming such
persons were found not to be within an existing statutory category. Perhaps
most easy was the reply that Louisiana's "statutory assortment of the people
of a state on the line of race 3 59 was not unreasonable as a matter of law.
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Henry Billings Brown seized the easy
reply and with it easily passed over Walker and Tourg6e's underlying
arguments about racial identity. Writing the majority opinion, Justice Brown
found that the Louisiana Separate Car Act was a "reasonable regulation"
within the state legislature's discretion. "In determining the question of
reasonableness," Justice Brown declared, the state was "at liberty to act with
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and
with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the
public peace and good order." He cast the Act then as clearly within the
state's police power, as the Louisiana high court had ruled.36°
Justice Brown paused over the identity arguments only long enough
to establish the legal authority of an option Walker and Tourg6e posed. He
accepted that Plessy's race could be in dispute but not that Plessy's race
could be indeterminable by law. He found "a legal distinction between the
white and colored races"36 wholly reasonable, as reflecting the reality of "a
distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must
always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by
color. 3 62 If Plessy had been misidentified by race or color, he could sue in
state court in Justice Brown's opinion, for it was for the appropriate state
court to decide the question whether Plessy "is not lawfully entitled to the
reputation of being a white man. 3 63 Thus, Justice Brown replied directly to
Walker and Tourg~e's argument that Plessy represented "the case of a man
who believed he had a right to the privilege and advantage of being esteemed
a white man, asserting that right against the action.. . intent on putting upon
him the indignity of belonging to the colored race.
64
3s8 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 35.
"9 Id. at 33.
360 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id. at 549.
36 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 32, at 50-51.
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In Justice Brown's view, the state had the capacity to decide racial
identity. Indeed, he noted that different states chose different measures. And
apparently he saw nothing denying the state such capacity either to decide
racial identity or to adopt different measures to assign racial identity. In
arguing to deny state capacity, Walker and Tourgfe had supplied nothing in
regard to source of authority or in regard to process. They had argued about
outcome, about the disparate impact of "statutory assortment"3 65 schemes.
Justice Brown brushed aside the discrimination arguments. His
opinion for the Court declared that "we are unable to see how this statute
deprives [Plessy] of, or in any way affects his right., 366 Justice Brown and
his brothers in the majority saw no "annoyance or oppression 3 67 of persons
of African descent in Louisiana's Separate Car Act.368 Justice Brown wrote
that "the underlying fallacy of [Plessy's] argument ... [was] the assumption
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority. If this be so," the Justice declared, "it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to
put that construction upon it."
369
Justice John Marshall Harlan vigorously dissented from the
majority's reasoning and result in Plessy.370  Rejecting the Court's
"conclusion that it is competent for a State to regulate the enjoyment by
citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race,"37' he embraced
Walker and Tourgfe's discrimination arguments. Yet Justice Harlan no less
declined the racial indeterminacy arguments. He, like the majority, accepted
racial definition and the reality of a black race and a white race. He accepted
more also but not along the line that Plessy's counsel offered. Articulating
the falsity of the majority's "two races 3 72 view, Harlan exposed his own
ugly racism in writing of another race-the Chinese-as "a race so different
from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens
of the United States. 373
Yet closer scrutiny showed the majority itself appearing to recognize
more than white and colored. In brushing aside Plessy's Thirteenth
Amendment argument, the Court referred to the Constitution outlawing "the
365 Id. at 33.
366 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
367 Id. at 550.
368 1890 La. Acts 152.
369 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
370 id. at 552-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
371 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
372 Id. at 548.
373 Id. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and
the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. R. 151 (1996) (discussing Justice Harlan's views on the Chinese and U.S.
law). See also TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN (1995).
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Chinese coolie trade 3 74 and "Mexican peonage. 375  It further used the
Chinese for a contrasting point to Justice Harlan's view. Noting that the
Chinese had been objects of discrimination and other ill-treatment, the Court
used them to illustrate the protections of U.S. law.376 The Court trumpeted
its holding in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,377 in which it struck down a San Francisco
municipal ordinance purporting to regulate laundries. 378  The ordinance
proved to be unconstitutional, in the Court's words, because "[i]t was held to
be a covert attempt on the part of the municipality to make an arbitrary and
unjust discrimination against the Chinese race. 379  In contrast to Justice
Harlan's use of the Chinese to illustrate unreasonable elements of law, the
majority used the Chinese to illustrate reasonableness. Explaining Yick Wo
further, the Court emphasized its view "that every exercise of the police
power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are enacted in
good faith for the promotion for the public good, and not for the annoyance
or oppression of a particular class."38
Neither the Plessy majority nor the dissent appeared to grasp any
idea of questioning not merely whether government had authority to
recognize race as a legal category for a specified purpose but whether
government could in fact recognize race. Racial indeterminacy appeared
beyond the reach of reason in that day. What it was that government
recognized as race when using it as a legal category did not appear as an
issue among the Court's brethren. Both Justice Brown for the majority and
Justice Harlan in dissent appeared to accept race as a clear category, as a set
of "distinctions based upon physical differences. 3 8 1 Whether two, three,
four or more existed, race existed in fact in the common view of Justice
Brown, Justice Harlan, and their fellow Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
They accepted race as a determinable, conclusive biological classification
that stood as an un-crossable divide.3 2 And in doing so they left tragically to
later generations of Americans the problem of sorting out the source of
identity in law.
374 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
375 Id.
376 Id.
377 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
378 Id. at 374.
179 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
380 id. (noting that while Yick Wo treated a municipal ordinance, the rule against "arbitrary and
unjust discrimination" applied also to acts of a state legislature exercising the police power).
381 Id. at 55 1.
382 Id. See HALE, supra note 181 (discussing the social construction of U.S. segregation); IAN F.
HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (discussing the
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AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991) (same).
20041

